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STATE-OF-THE-ART
Simulation models are useful to explain evolutionary processes. They have been widely used to model knowledge
networking, the process by which agents interact to create knowledge. They have also been used to model knowledge
creation by agents in a network.
So far, simulation models have somehow neglected the interrelation of the processes of knowledge creation and
network formation. This interrelation arises because agents choose the partners with whom they are going to create
knowledge and, as they do, change their future behavior and outputs.
Most of the empirical studies aiming at explaining the relation between the network of an agent and his performance use
measures of the network around one agent as a determinant of the output of the agent, and thus disregard any possible
feedback. As a consequence, results are mixed and inconclusive. Some studies indicate that knowledge is a
collaborative process, that is to say, that the more intensely agents collaborate, the more knowledge they create. Other
studies suggest that the number of collaborators is not a determinant of the performance of agents and finally, some
studies find that collaborating can be somehow harmful for performance. 
These different studies consider an exogenous network structure, i.e. they take this structure as given and predict its
impact on knowledge creation. This is not realistic, mainly because agents choose their collaborators for specific
reasons, including reputation or previous performance. Thus, network formation and creation are endogenous
processes. The structure of the network affects the output of agents, which determines the future structure of the
network. Previous empirical studies did not account for this feedback, which can explain the ambiguous results they
obtained. 
 RESEARCH GAP
Nonetheless, few studies have theoretically modeled the interaction of the network and the creation of knowledge, and
none has analyzed their coevolution. The aim of this study is to cover this gap by crafting a simulation model of an
endogenous and evolving network of agents that create knowledge. Simulations of the model will generate different
theoretical scenarios of the parallel or opposite coevolution of knowledge networks and knowledge creation, reconciling
the confronting empirical evidence.
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS. 
 
In each step, the agents will form a network and create a certain amount of knowledge. The probability that two agents
collaborate at some time increases with previous collaboration and with the attractiveness of the agents. The amount of
knowledge created by an agent depends on the structure of his ego network and on the stock of knowledge he
possesses. Both functions are based on empirical and theoretical literature.
METHOD
The model has been programmed using R. For the simulations, n=100 agents interact for T=500 periods, with the first
100 periods as warm-up. Different behaviors emerge for different sets of parameters, depending mainly on whether
collaborations are profitable (if the amount of knowledge created from collaborations is high enough compared to the
cost of maintaining a collaboration), the amount of knowledge created from the previous knowledge, and whether
collaborators are chosen depending on their previous history of collaboration or on their attractiveness. The effect of
these parameters is isolated in some of the simulations. 
RESULTS 
The simulations of the model show that all the different cases of knowledge creation through collaboration can be
originated by a single process. Moreover, the model draws attention to several features of the process that could
otherwise be neglected. First of all, the positive relation between the number of collaborators and the performance of
agents can be due to the process of partner selection rather than to the process of knowledge creation. Also, the model
signals that in the creation of knowledge in networks, the main determinant of performance is not necessarily the
collaboration itself. Furthermore, it indicates the importance of considering a possible negative effect of collaborations
for knowledge creation. These results have important implications for the design of policies aiming at improving the
process of knowledge creation in networks.
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Theoretical literature acknowledges the interplay between knowledge
creation and network collaboration, but related formal models are scarce.
Empirical studies show conﬂicting evidence about the relation between
knowledge creation and network collaboration (positive, none, or nega-
tive), perhaps because they take little account of their endogeneity. The
simulation model in this paper deepens formal theoretical understanding
and reconciles the evidence by analysing feedbacks between both pro-
cesses.
The model also highlights some aspects of these feedbacks that may
not be desirable. Collaboration can increase disparities between agents be-
cause of the cumulative nature of knowledge creation. Collaboration may
not boost knowledge creation, if collaborators are an innocuous byproduct
of the attractiveness of most productive agents. Most productive agents
may attract many collaborators and become less productive if the cost
of networking is high, and even improductive if the cost of networking
is higher than its contribution to knowledge creation. The model oﬀers
some keys to design policies that avoid these scenarios.
1 Introduction
Simulation models are useful to explain evolutionary processes. They have been
widely used to model knowledge networking, the process by which agents inter-
act to create knowledge. Some interesting examples are the models of inventor
networks by Ter Wal (2013), researchers collaboration by Petersen et al. (2012),
or interﬁrm R&D alliances by Ahrweiler et al. (2004). They have also been
used to model knowledge creation by agents in a network. For those models,
knowledge can be considered as an abstract idea (Cowan and Jonard, 2003),
or can be measured as an output of the abstract knowledge, as the number of
scientiﬁc papers for researchers (Borner et al., 2004), or new products for ﬁrms
(Malerba et al., 1999).
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So far, these simulation models have somehow neglected the interrelation of
the processes of knowledge creation and network formation. This interrelation
arises because agents choose the partners with whom they are going to create
knowledge and, as they do, change their future behavior and outputs (Baum
et al., 2010). Nonetheless, few studies have theoretically modeled the interaction
of the network and the creation of knowledge, with some important exceptions
such as the work by Cowan and Jonard (2004), who emphasized the complex
nature of knowledge creation through collaboration but did not analyze their
coevolution. In this work, we claim that this scarcity of theory accounting
for the feedback between both processes can explain the apparently conﬂicting
empirical evidence on the relation between the network and the performance of
agents.
Such empirical evidence belongs to a wide and growing body of literature
that seeks to explain the relation between the network of an agent and his per-
formance (for a broad review, see Ozman, 2009 and Phelps et al., 2012). Most
of those empirical studies use measures of the network around one agent (his ego
network) as an explanation of the output of the agent, and thus disregard any
possible feedback. As a consequence, results are mixed and inconclusive. It is
unclear, for instance, how the simplest measure of the ego networks, the number
of collaborators (or degree) of an agent, aﬀects his performance. Some studies
indicate that knowledge is a collaborative process, that is to say, that the more
intensely agents collaborate, the more knowledge they create. An example of
this behavior can be found in the work by Ahuja (2000), where collaborations
can provide agents with resources and new information. Other studies suggest
that the number of collaborators is not determinant of the performance of agents.
For example, Bell (2005) found no signiﬁcant relation between the number of
formal ties of a ﬁrm and its innovativeness. He suggested that institutional
ties were used solely for the transmission of relatively well-known information.
Finally, some studies ﬁnd that collaborating can be somehow harmful for per-
formance. As McFadyen and Cannella Jr. (2004) put it, the greater the number
of diﬀerent relationships that an individual must maintain, the less the eﬀort
the individual can put into creation activities. Thus, at some point, agents can
have too many collaborators and start to underperform compared to those with
less partners.
These diﬀerent studies consider an exogenous network structure, i.e. they
take this structure as given and predict its impact on knowledge creation. This
is not realistic, mainly because agents choose their collaborators for speciﬁc rea-
sons, including reputation or previous performance (Wagner and Leydesdorﬀ,
2005; Balland et al., 2012). Thus, network formation and creation are endoge-
nous processes. The structure of the network aﬀects the output of agents, which
determines the future structure of the network. Previous empirical studies did
not account for this feedback, which can explain the ambiguous results they
obtained.
The aim of this study is to cover this gap by crafting a simulation model of
an endogenous and evolving network of agents that create knowledge. Simula-
tions of the model will generate diﬀerent theoretical scenarios of the parallel or
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opposite coevolution of knowledge networks and knowledge creation, reconciling
the confronting results of the existing literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the coevolution
model of knowledge creation and knowledge networks. Section 3 shows the
results that can be extracted from the simulations. Finally, Section 4 discusses
the diﬀerent results.
2 The model
Let us consider a model where a set of S = {1, . . . , n} agents interact over T
periods of time. In each step, they will form a network and create a certain
amount of knowledge. The network will be represented by its adjacency matrix
t, where t(i, j) takes the value 1 if i and j collaborate in step t, and 0 otherwise.
The degree (or number of collaborators) of agent i in step t will be dt(i) =∑
j t(i, j). This is the simplest indicator to measure the ego network, and it is
typically used in the empirical literature as in Bell (2005) or Cooke and Wills
(1999). The network in each step will be created depending both on the network
and the knowledge created in previous steps. As the network is created in each
step, links are allowed to break and form over time. Likewise, the amount of
knowledge created in each step will depend ﬁrst on the amount of knowledge
created in previous steps, and also on the structure of the network. Agents start
the simulations as homogeneous. As the simulation develops, agents become
heterogeneous in their knowledge endowment and in their ego network. A link
between two agents can be created in any step even if they did not collaborate
in the past. Likewise, two agents can stop an existing collaboration if the link
is not updated in a following step.
Knowledge networks are evolving: links between agents break and form as a
result of strategic decisions (Barabasi et al., 2002; Fleming and Frenken, 2007).
These strategic decisions have usually two components, the previous history and
the attractiveness of agents (Ahrweiler et al., 2004). Having previously collabo-
rated increases willingness to engage in knowledge creation (Cowan et al., 2006;
Baum et al., 2010), so the probability that a link forms between two agents
increases with previous collaboration. Also, more experienced and successful
agents are more likely to ﬁnd partners (Wagner and Leydesdorﬀ, 2005; Balland
et al., 2012), so the probability of collaborating will increase with the attrac-
tiveness of the agents. As a result, the structure of the network aﬀects not only
agents' performance, but also their future behavior (Ahuja, 2000; Cowan et al.,
2006).
The probability that agent i collaborates with agent j is a linear combination
of their previous history and the attractiveness of agent j (Equation 1); respec-
tively weighted by λ and 1 − λ constrained to [0, 1]. The attractiveness of an
agent depends on the amount of knowledge he has previously created, relative
to the knowledge created by the rest of the agents in the network. This function
is inspired by the preferential attachment algorithm (Barabasi and Albert, 1999;
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Albert and Barabasi, 2002).















The probability that agents i and j collaborate is that either of them collab-
orates with the other (Equation 2). In taking probabilities we account for the
fact that they can be willing to collaborate but may not be able to do so for
some reason. The probability that a link breaks, that is, that a collaboration in
time t− 1 does not continue in time t, is 1− P (i→ j, t).
P (i↔ j) = P (i→ j ∪ j → i) (2)
Equation 3 shows the functional form for the creation of knowledge. The
performance of agents in a knowledge network can be deeply inﬂuenced by
the structure of the network (De Solla Price, 1965; Guler and Nerkar, 2012).
The amount of knowledge created by agent i at time t, κ(i, t), depends on the
structure of his ego network and on the stock of knowledge he possesses. On
the one hand, the more collaborators he has the more knowledge he produces,
which is captured by parameter θ. Thus, θ can be interpreted as the amount
of knowledge created in each collaboration. On the other hand, collaborations
can be costly (McFadyen and Cannella Jr., 2004; Ozman, 2009), and thus a
very high number of collaborations can hamper the creation of knowledge. This
is captured by parameter γ and the square of the number of collaborations, so
small numbers of collaborations will have a positive eﬀect, but high numbers will
decrease the knowledge created. No negative amounts of knowledge or negative
costs are allowed, so θ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0.












Finally, knowledge is a cumulative process: new knowledge can be created
from previous knowledge (Jaﬀe et al., 2000). Parameter α measures how much
new knowledge is created from the stock of knowledge of agent i, and hence it
accounts for the cumulativeness of knowledge. The length of the time window
is τ , the number of periods before the knowledge becomes obsolete.
This functional form implicitly assumes that there are only two possible
sources of new knowledge for an agent: collaborations and the pool of knowledge
he already possesses. Due to the recombinant nature of knowledge (Konig et al.,
2011; 2012), if an agent was not to collaborate at any time for some reason, the
possible amount of new combinations of his existing knowledge would be limited.
At some point, he would not be able to keep on creating new knowledge unless
he started collaborating. Thus, given this functional form for the creation of
knowledge, α is necessarily bounded to [0, 1[.
This function is similar to the one used by Konig et al. (2011, 2012), al-
though it diﬀers in the amount of knowledge created by each collaboration. In
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their model, the amount of knowledge created by an agent is a recombination of
the knowledge stocks of the agent and his neighbors. In line with this approach,
we add a new dimension to the eﬀect the knowledge of neighbors has in the
knowledge of an agent. In our model, the amount of knowledge of the potential
neighbors is a determinant of the network creation function. Thus, the knowl-
edge stocks of the neighbors inﬂuence the amount of knowledge agents create
through its inﬂuence in whether or not they become collaborators. Although it
does not appear explicitly in the function of knowledge creation, it implicitly
aﬀects its result.
Notice that the agents' actions are not the result of an explicit decision
making process, as they do not develop strategies that maximize some objective
function like in the game theoretical literature (see for example Azagra-Caro
et al., 2008 or Westbrock, 2010). This approach is closer to the evolutionary
literature (Nelson and Winter, 1982) as it does not require any assumption on
the rationality of the agents.
Param. Interpretation Constraints
θ Amount of knowledge created from each collaboration θ ≥ 0
γ Cost of collaborating γ ≥ 0
α Amount of knowledge created from the stock 0 ≤ α < 1
λ Weight of previous collaboration in the probability to collaborate 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
τ Length of the time window (number of periods before the knowledge becomes obsolete) τ ∈ N
Table 1: Parameter table
3 Results
The behavior of the simulations depends on the values of the parameters. In
this section we will present diﬀerent scenarios for diﬀerent sets of parameters.
For the simulations, we will consider a set of n = 100 agents interacting for
T = 500 periods, with a warm-up of 100 periods.
The results of the simulations are not dependent on the length of the time
window τ as long as it is higher than 1. For τ = 1 only two possible scenarios
appear: either a complete network or an empty network emerge very quickly,
so agents collaborate either with everybody else, or with no one else1. In the
simulations we will use a value of τ = 5, which is found standard in the literature
(Song et al., 2003; McFadyen and Cannella Jr., 2004; Agrawal, 2006; Fleming
et al., 2007).
The behavior of the model is depicted in the following ﬁgures. For each
ﬁgure, the number of collaborators and the amount of knowledge of each agent
1For τ = 1, the agents producing the maximum amount of knowledge maintain their
collaborators with probability 1. Either the network remains empty and no one produces
knowledge, or one of the agents starts producing knowledge, attracts the rest, and the network
becomes complete and stable.
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is plotted for the last 400 steps of the simulations, resulting in 40000 diﬀerent
points. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show an example of the three possible scenarios
described in the empirical literature.
Figure 1: Positive coevolution
Figure 2: Independent coevolution
Figure 3: Negative coevolution
When the amount of knowledge created through collaborations, θ, is high
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enough compared to the cost of maintaining a collaboration, γ, collaborations
are proﬁtable. In such a case, the process can produce two distinct patterns:
a positive coevolution (Figure 1) or an independent coevolution (Figure 2).
First, if the amount of knowledge created from the stock, α, is low, knowledge
comes mainly from collaborations. Thus, the relation between the number of
collaborations and the creation of knowledge is usually positive (Figure 1). On
the other hand, when α is high, both collaborations and previous knowledge are
important sources of new knowledge. The eﬀect of both parameters is mixed:
the performance of agents with many collaborators and agents with a small
number of collaborators but a large stock of knowledge is similar. Thus, the
coevolution is independent, as the number of collaborators seems not to aﬀect
the creation of knowledge (Figure 2).
Finally, collaborations are not necessarily proﬁtable. If the cost of main-
taining a collaboration, γ, surpasses the amount of knowledge created through
collaborations, θ, every new collaboration is prejudicial for the performance of
agents. In such a case, the amount of knowledge created is decreasing in the
number of collaborations, and the observed coevolution is opposite (Figure 3).
Without considering a drawback to collaboration, this coevolution pattern can
never appear. Thus, it is important to consider some kind of collaboration costs
in order to replicate the negative coevolution of collaboration and creation of
knowledge.
To fully grasp the complexity of the model described here, let us consider a
change in only one of the parameters, leaving the rest unchanged. A change in a
parameter of the knowledge equation will clearly result in changes in the knowl-
edge created by the network, and a change in the parameters of the network
formation equation should result in changes in the network structure. However,
the results of changing one parameter are much more interesting, because of the
relation between those two functions. Figures 4 and 5 show some examples of
the complex behavior of the model due to the feedback between the process of
knowledge creation and the process of network formation.
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(a) From a negative to a positive coevolution (b) Diﬀerences in the amount of knowledge cre-
ated
Figure 4: Eﬀect of an increase in λ
Consider that we ﬁx all the parameters in the knowledge creation function
and vary only λ, the weight of having previously collaborated in the probability
to collaborate, from 0.1 to 0.9 (Figure 4). When λ = 0.1, the probability to
collaborate depends mainly on the attractiveness of agents; while when λ =
0.9, it depends mainly on whether or not the two agents have collaborated in
the previous steps. With this increase in λ, the process can switch from a
negative to a positive coevolution scenario (Figure 4a). In such a case, the
positive coevolution is not driven by the knowledge creation function but by
the network formation process. That is to say, the coevolution is positive not
because agents with more collaborators create more knowledge, but because the
most productive agents attract more collaborators. For such a high value of λ
as 0.9, all agents have a negligible attractiveness except the most productive
ones. Thus, only the most productive agents can attract any new collaborator,
while the rest just renew their old collaborations.
If the underlying behavior for a low value of λ was an independent co-
evolution (Figure 4b), then collaborations are not harmful for the knowledge
creation process. In such a case, increasing the value of λ can lead to a cer-
tain Matthew eﬀect: the most productive agents attract more collaborations
and thus perform even better, increasing the performance diﬀerence with the
least productive agents. Thus, some agents perform better, and many agents
perform worse, if collaborations are based on previous history rather than on
attractiveness.
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(a) From positive to negative coevolution (b) Changes in the network
Figure 5: Eﬀect of an increase in γ
A similar behavior can appear for changes in parameters of the knowledge
function. Increasing γ, the cost of collaborating, from 0.1 to 0.9 can change
the overall coevolution from positive, where collaborations are proﬁtable, to
negative, where collaborations are harmful for the knowledge creation process
(Figure 5a). Of course, the amount of knowledge created will be higher for lower
values of this cost. Moreover, the change can be so drastic that only agents with
very few collaborators are able to produce any knowledge at all (Figure 5b). In
such a case, increasing γ will lead to a lower number of collaborations in the
resulting knowledge network. This looks similar than the mechanism shown by
Figure 3. However, there is a diﬀerence. Figure 3 represents that the cost of
network collaboration is higher than the amount of knowledge it creates. In
Figure 5, this is not necessary: most productive agents in early periods attract
collaborators and, if the cost of collaboration is high enough (even if lower than
the amount of knowledge it creates), they may become less productive in later
periods (even less productive than agents with fewer collaborators).
4 Discussion and conclusions
This paper presents a simulation model of the coevolution of knowledge networks
and knowledge creation. This kind of model is specially important in current
times, when knowledge appears to be increasingly an interactive process and a
deeper understanding can help improving the performance of the system in a
more eﬃcient way. This paper suggests that diﬀerent scenarios of coevolution
can arise depending on the importance of collaborations for knowledge creation,
the importance of previous knowledge and the process of partner selection. The
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simulations show that the model is suited to reproduce a stylized process of
knowledge creation through collaborations. Two simple rules of behavior are
enough to reproduce the diﬀerent scenarios found in the empirical literature,
that correspond to diﬀerent cases of apparently conﬂicting empirical evidence.
Thus, all those diﬀerent cases of knowledge creation through collaboration can
be originated by a single process.
Moreover, it draws attention to several features of the process that could
otherwise be neglected. First of all, the positive relation between the number
of collaborators and the performance of agents can be due to the process of
partner selection rather than to the process of knowledge creation. This has
important implications for researchers, as it points out the importance of tak-
ing into account the endogeneity of the network when analyzing the eﬀect of
collaborations in knowledge creation.
Furthermore, the model indicates the possible negative eﬀect of collabora-
tions for knowledge creation. Despite the general belief that collaborations boost
performance and knowledge creation, it is important to remember that collabo-
rations are not costless. The cost of establishing and maintaining a collaboration
can sometimes surpass the beneﬁts of collaborating. Managers should consider
these costs when deciding whether or not to collaborate with other agents.
Finally, it points out the importance of the process of partner selection. The
study indicates that the process of knowledge creation is hampered by myopic
partner selection processes, based on previous history rather than attractiveness.
If agents are bounded to their previous collaborations, the overall performance
of the system is lower whereas if they can freely establish new links or break
them, the levels of performance achieved by the system are higher. Policy
makers aiming at improving knowledge creation process should try to reduce the
importance of having previously collaborated in agents' decision to collaborate,
as well as reducing the costs of collaborating. In such a case, policies aiming
a improving the creation of knowledge can focus at improving the legal and
social framework. If previous history is important due to a context of high
uncertainty and instability, a solution can be improving the legal framework
in order to reduce the risk of hold-up and thus increase agents' willingness to
interact to unknown partners. In the case of a social context where agents
have few opportunities to meet new partners and thus start new collaborations,
encouraging agents to increase the number of collaborations can be enough to
force the creation of linkages with new partners. When the goal of a policy is
to increase both knowledge creation and collaboration, they can be achieved by
focusing on improving collaboration.
The usefulness of having a model that reproduces a stylized process of knowl-
edge creation through collaborations is manifold. The prediction of the coevolu-
tion of knowledge creation in a network can help agents to settle the convenience
to enter an already existing knowledge network. It can also predict the possi-
bility of a certain Matthew eﬀect, so it can be considered for policy design.
Additionally, such a model can be used for the diagnosis of an operating sys-
tem. It can help ﬁguring out what happened in a process that was well ﬁtted
and suddenly changed its behavior.
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This paper has some limitations. First of all, the simulation model sug-
gests diﬀerent lines of action for diﬀerent underlying processes. Picking out the
right process is essential to choose the right action to implement. In order to
address this issue, the model will be empirically validated in future research.
This empirical validation will help to identify the most likely parameters of a
real knowledge creation process. It can also lead to a comparison of diﬀerent
knowledge creation processes. Furthermore, in a next stage of research it would
we desirable to implement policy actions. The model will have to be able to in-
corporate parameter changes through time. Then, the policy actions suggested
for the diﬀerent scenarios will be tested through simulations, in a secure and
costless way.
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